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Abstract 
This essay comprises an overview of the plot to Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
followed by a more detailed examination of the three parts of the book. It begins by showing 
the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty’s project, while explaining the significance of 
PMN for both Rorty’s philosophy as a whole, and the history of philosophy.  Then follows 
the overview, after which I explain the detail of Rorty’s arguments, while developing a line 
of argument to show that Rorty’s final conclusion that there is no objective truth – because 
the world can be endlessly redescribed – undermines his argumentative strategy. Taking into 
account Rorty’s standard response, according to which he was making a pragmatic social 
proposal, I conclude that Rorty’s desire to avoid the nihilistic conclusion that life is 
meaningless, led him to transform existentialism into postmodernism; and that the result, 
however brilliant, is nevertheless unstable and badly motivated. 
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1. Metaphilosophy 
 
Metaphilosophy attracts malcontents. If you are a philosopher who does not much like the 
contemporary philosophical scene you find yourself within, then there is a good chance you 
will start to think about what philosophy is, or could be. Then you can either set about 
transforming it into something more true to the essence your metaphilosophical reflections 
reveal it to have, and which you think the contemporary scene has strayed from; or else set 
about moulding it to your vision of what it should become. Philosophical malcontents have 
this luxury because the nature of their discipline is a notoriously elusive affair, cloaked in a 
long and diverse history, and designated by a title that means very little. Other disciplines 
rarely provide space for equivalent self-questioning, except at rare, pivotal points in their 
histories; but each new generation of philosophers has the option to turn their thought 
primarily upon philosophy itself, rather than the problems it delivers as default. Rorty took 
this option, with the dissatisfaction behind it fuelling a career-long effort to transform it into 
something more socially useful. It was a mission that defined his thinking.    
 
Metaphilosophy is not just for malcontents. Establishment figures take it up too; Timothy 
Williamson (2007) provides a good recent example. But this kind of metaphilosophy bears 
little resemblance to the Rortyan variety. Williamson’s interest is in honing philosophical 
methodology so the exact science he thinks his discipline has been steadily evolving into can 
make even better progress in future. He has little interest in determining the nature of 
philosophy (ibid.: 4), and thinks it should be essentially what it is now, only better. His 
dissatisfaction is limited to irritation with junior colleagues who cannot resist making big 
claims, when they should content themselves with modest ones that can be proved – through 
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diligent hard work – beyond any shadow of a doubt (ibid.: 278ff.). For that is how piece-meal 
progress is to be achieved.  
 
Rorty’s metaphilosophical message was always diametrically opposed to this. For Rorty, the 
history of philosophy leaves its current nature essentially up for grabs, while providing ample 
reason to think that regular attempts, made ever since Kant, to place it on ‘the secure path of a 
science’ have been badly motivated, peripheral to the best insights that tradition has to offer, 
and ultimately doomed to failure. Rorty liked big claims – the bigger the better – and often 
maligned as “scholasticism” the kind of tight argumentation that focuses on the detail, while 
leaving the big picture for posterity to determine. Rorty wanted social impact now, and his 
Hegelian historicism persuaded him that this was all philosophy could realistically aspire to.1 
He liked Sellars best, for instance, in those “few places” where he “let himself go” in order to 
provide a “vision of world history” (Rorty 1997: 10). Mainstream analytic philosophers who 
admire Sellars, by contrast, will typically cite his technical prowess to justify their 
admiration. Perhaps Rorty was more honest. Perhaps his lack of faith in the ability of 
technical argumentation to reach the truth, led him to pin his hopes for philosophy to achieve 
cultural respect and influence elsewhere. Perhaps these hopes, combined with his reflections 
on the history of philosophy, are what produced his lack of faith in argument and truth. 
  
Rorty identifies a distinct kind of revolutionary metaphilosophy from his own, which seems 
to offer a mid-point between the extreme poles of business-as-usual and all-change 
metaphilosophy (Rorty 1979: 365ff.). Thus he thinks that philosophers who the share the 
same aim as normal systematic philosophers – that of science-like, incremental progress – 
may turn to metaphilosophy because they do not think extant methods can achieve it. So they 
invent a revolutionary new approach to philosophy. Logical positivism provides a prime 
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example, with its metaphilosophy combining reflection on what philosophy had been and 
should become. The positivists saw that philosophy had hitherto combined metaphysics and 
analysis, and liking the latter but not the former, sought to make philosophy what it ought to 
be by eradicating metaphysics, while presenting a new vision of the purposes and methods of 
analysis.  
 
Rorty’s metaphilosophy shares something of this approach, in that he finds inspiration for his 
vision of what philosophy ought to be from its history. He likes Hegel’s broad historical 
narratives and conception of philosophy as its time “held in thought”; and he likes subsequent 
“edifying” philosophers like Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Dewey, who react against and try 
to disrupt the efforts of systematic philosophers, in an effort to instigate new directions in the 
thought of their time. Since he aspired to be an edifying philosopher himself, then, his 
approach in this regard may seem to be essentially the same as the positivists’; he just had 
different ideas about where the wheat / chaff distinction lies.2 But there are two differences 
which might distinguish his metaphilosophy as of a unique kind.  
 
The first is that he rejects the Kantian aim of making philosophy scientific, because he thinks 
this cannot be done, and that there is no good reason to want to do it anyway; only obsolete 
social needs, lack of historical awareness, and pressure to conform to an intellectual culture 
dominated by science. He also thinks this Kantian aim will lead philosophy down the path of 
insularity, and detract from its ability to play its part in “cultural politics” (Rorty 2007a). The 
second is that Rorty denies that philosophy has a historical essence, which we can reflect on 
to distinguish the chaff from the wheat. On his minimalist conception, philosophy is just “a 
genealogical linkage connecting certain past figures with certain present figures . . . an 
ancestral relation of overlapping fibers” (Rorty 1991: 67).3 How the authors caught up in this 
5 
 
literary web are to be interpreted is a matter he leaves open; and doing so makes space for 
him to realise his ambitions concerning what philosophy ought to be.  
 
I do not think these differences mark out a distinctive approach to metaphilosophy, however. 
The first gains much of its force from the claim that philosophy cannot proceed like science, 
which would require a good argument to back it up; an argument which, on the face of it, 
PMN provides. Such an argument would seem to need to take place on a realist plain to have 
any purchase on its target; which again is what, on the face of it, transpires in PMN – despite 
its conclusions apparently precluding such argumentation. But arguing against previous 
approaches to philosophy is what all revolutionary philosophy does. And the second 
purported difference is put in doubt by the fact that Rorty’s interpretations of the historical 
figures he discusses are fairly conventional in PMN, and apparently need to be, in order for 
his arguments to find their mark. So I think Rorty was, after all, just cherry-picking the parts 
of the history of philosophy he liked best, and suggesting a way to put them together into a 
new and improved programme. His metaphilosophical approach was essentially the same as 
the revolutionary systematic philosopher, except without the systematic aims; but this 
difference is simply because he disapproved of systematic philosophy, rather as the 
positivists disapproved of metaphysics. 
 
Now rather than diving straight into the contents of PMN, I have so far been concerned with 
its metaphilosophical trajectory, which strikes me as rather more familiar than he would have 
us believe. This beginning seems appropriate, given that the reason PMN is such an important 
book is that it is where Rorty presents his metaphilosophy. Moreover, it is where he argues 
for it. In his other major work, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty acted out that vision 
by practicing philosophy the way he thought it should be practiced; he provided a concrete 
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model of a possible future the first book motivated. As such, the two fit together perfectly. 
The second repeats some of the arguments of the first in its early chapters, albeit it in 
condensed form, but Rorty’s scepticism about the value of argument here becomes more 
prominent than before (Rorty 1989: 8ff.; Rorty 1979: 12), and his main concern is now with 
doing something new; with reading philosophy as literature, such that its authors are driven 
on not by a will to understand the world, but rather the need to express their individuality, for 
instance.  
 
Rorty was most proud of his second book (Rorty 2007b: 17), and occasionally went out of his 
way to slight the first, describing it as, for instance, “partly amateurish cultural history and 
partly an attempt to dissolve certain very particular problems which were being discussed by 
analytic philosophers in the 1970s” (Rorty 2000: 214). There is enough plausibility to this to 
see how an older Rorty might have convinced himself of it; but it simply does not ring true 
with the incredible scope, ambition, and – especially in its final part – passion of the book. 
Nor with the fact that his pre-PMN works essentially lead up it (Rorty 2014), and that there is 
very little it contains which he did not continue to press home for the rest of his life. Nothing 
substantial was abandoned; he simply lost enthusiasm for some of its terminology (and most 
notably, gained enthusiasm for the terminology of “pragmatism”), some of its history, and a 
couple of philosophers he had once seen as allies. Even his irony and solidarity combination 
– ostensibly the main conceptual novelty of the second book – was presaged in the first under 
a different terminological guise (Rorty 1979: 383-7). As he said himself in his final 
assessment, “I still believe most of what I wrote in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” 
(Rorty 2007b: 13) – an understatement, in my view. But he went on to say it was “out of 
date”, having been superseded by better critiques of the mind-body problem and 
epistemology by Daniel Dennett and Michael Williams respectively. Even if there was some 
7 
 
truth to this, however, the older Rorty neglects the fact that within his book, these critiques 
underpin a unique and overarching purpose; he rather uncharacteristically failed to make a 
holistic assessment. 
 
He also says that the second book did “on a larger scale” what the first had done, namely 
provide a “big swooshy narrative of the history of Western thought” (ibid.: 17). Again, I find 
it hard to see it that way. The inclusion of politics, literature, and much more continental 
philosophy might justify “larger scale”, I suppose; though PMN was arguing for a pluralistic 
democracy between all discourses about the world. However CIS strikes me as considerably 
more piece-meal, containing readings of Proust, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Nabakov and 
Orwell, which are indeed held together by a narrative, but which might have stood on their 
own; it all seems much less “swooshy” to me. More importantly, it strikes me as a very 
different kind of book primarily because by this point, Rorty saw philosophy as one kind of 
literature among others, and is acting out that vision; the justification offered is secondary, 
and largely recycled. But in PMN, Rorty is making an urgent case that there is something 
seriously wrong with philosophy as it has hitherto been practiced, and his suggestions for 
how it might continue in future come only at the very end (the last six pages). The emphasis 
reversed, which is why the second so naturally follows the first.  
 
Still, it is easy to see why Rorty might have favoured CIS, for it realised the vision that meant 
so much for him; he had become bigger than analytic philosophy, and was now trying to 
engage in cultural politics. PMN simply laid the metaphilosophical foundations for him to do 
what he wanted, and he did not want to get bogged down in an ongoing defence of them. Plus 
creative people typically favour their later work; otherwise they would lose the clearest 
justification for their having kept going. But it is just as easy to see why PMN is the book 
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analytic philosophers continue to regard as Rorty’s main work. For it speaks to and 
challenges them, while offering conclusions much bigger and more exciting than they are 
accustomed to, outside of their acquaintance with more distant historical figures; seemingly 
outrageous conclusions that just beg to be overturned – by those open-minded enough to 
empathise with his point of view, and not just use the scale of his interests as an excuse to 
dismiss his arguments as “sloppy”.  
 
I am inclined to take the essentially Rortyan line that the success of CIS will be determined 
by whether the approach to philosophy demonstrated there will be adopted by others and bear 
sufficiently interesting fruit. Alan Malachowski thinks it will, and maybe he is right; we will 
have to wait to see how the “New Pragmatism” pans out (Malachowski 2010). However I 
think PMN is already successful. Not because it brought an end to representationalism, taught 
the world how to be “consistent” atheists (Rorty 1998: 62), and instigated a revolution in 
philosophy. So far it has categorically failed on all these fronts, and that situation may well 
not change. Rather, it was successful because it made Rorty a canonical figure whose ideas 
are part of the history of philosophy. The impact of those ideas on contemporary, cutting-
edge debates is hard to access, as is the impact of, say, Sartre and Quine; but it is certainly 
there, and shines clearly through on occasion. But as with all canonical figures, articles and 
books about him are regularly produced, and that, it seems to me, is the result of his book 
addressed squarely to philosophers, rather than the one that showed them and others 
something new. So long as the history of philosophy never becomes entirely detached from 
its ongoing debates, Rorty’s ideas will have the potential to affect them. Sceptical 
metaphilosophy was nothing new with PMN, of course, but Rorty’s achievement with that 
book was to place a dedicated, full-scale defence of it into the history of philosophy.  
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2. The Plot 
 
The plot of PMN goes something like this. The establishment’s conception of philosophy is 
all wrong. Philosophy is not an ancient discipline with a subject-matter consisting of 
perennial problems for the human intellect. Rorty does not think the traditional problems of 
philosophy are such that any suitably-primed member of the species Homo sapiens, whether 
from the Stone Age or the Space Age, would in principle be able to empathise with them. He 
does not think it was inevitable that people came to be concerned by these problems, but 
rather an accident of history. And he thinks that once we reflect on that history, together with 
the social irrelevance of these problems to the present age, we will be motivated to forget 
them; to simply leave them alone. Then we can turn our minds to finding something more 
useful to do with the great writings of the philosophical tradition, which may have been 
misguided, but which are still inspirational feats of the imagination. 
 
Rather than an ancient discipline dealing with perennial problems, Rorty thinks philosophy as 
we know it now began to arise in the 17th century, when intellectuals fixated on the metaphor 
of the mind as a mirror of nature; a metaphor which already had cultural currency, having 
been poetically employed by the likes of Shakespeare. These intellectuals started to take the 
metaphor literally. They started to think of the mind as each person’s first point of contact 
with the world; as a conglomeration of inner reflections of the environment, such that we are 
guided around that environment by knowledge of these reflections. This idea was fixated 
upon it because it seemed relevant to the pressing intellectual issue of the day, namely the 
conflict between church doctrine, and the new science of men like Galileo; a conflict most 
spectacularly illustrated by the disagreement about whether the Earth was at the centre of 
God’s creation, as the church insisted, or whether it was orbiting the Sun, as Galileo’s 
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observations and reasoning seemed to show. If the mind was a mirror of nature, and hence the 
basis of all knowledge was rooted in reflections hidden within each individual, then this 
seemed to vindicate the scientists’ reliance upon observation and reason. So reflection on 
mind seemed capable of providing foundations for science. 
 
Philosophy as we know it began to emerge, then, with an effort to assist science in its cultural 
conflict with the religious establishment. How effective the mirror of nature idea was in this 
regard is not an issue Rorty lingers over, but science did eventually secure its own secular 
autonomy, of course, and the church had to retreat from dictating the nature of God’s 
creation, to the more enlightened position that God provided us with the faculties to work 
these matters out for ourselves. In any case, Rorty’s polemical interest is in what happened 
next; namely that people started to see that the mirror of nature idea generated distinctive 
problems of its own. For it seemed the mirror would have to be different from the rest of the 
world, given its special reflecting qualities; but also part of it, in order to explain how mind 
and world can be in reciprocal communion – that was the metaphysical mind-body problem. 
And if we only see reflections of the world, then the question arises of how we can know 
those reflections are accurate – that was the epistemological “veil of perception” problem.  
 
Work consequently began on trying to solve these and other related problems, before in the 
late 18th century, Rorty’s nemesis – Kant – wrote the Critique of Pure Reason. This book 
transfigured the mirror of nature problematic, making it considerably more complex and 
multi-faceted than it had been before, while laying the foundations for Kant to go on to 
systematise pretty much everything – all aspects of human intellectual, emotional, aesthetic 
and political life. To this day, Kantians all around the world are still working out the 
implications of Kant’s views (or just what those views amount to). Kantian philosophy’s 
11 
 
resources are endless, and its implications all-encompassing. It provided subsequent 
generations with a paradigm to build a professional way of life around. And Kant provided 
this paradigm with an ancient history, by convincingly tracing his concerns back to those of 
Plato and Aristotle. This allowed him to lay claim to the honourific title ‘philosophy’, a word 
ineluctably associated with the Greeks, while making his paradigm seem continuous not only 
with over two millennia of Platonists and Aristotelians, but also with his immediate 
predecessors like Descartes and Locke, who had similarly grappled with the problems of the 
mirror. And thus, as Rorty sees it, philosophy as we know it was born. It has been part of the 
academic establishment ever since because of “Kant’s eternalization of the intellectual 
situation of eighteenth-century Europe” (Rorty 2007b: 13). 
 
Any potential for social value it may once have had has now long been expended, however, 
and yet the discipline continues to attract young scholars who fail to realise that without Kant, 
“Greek thought and seventeenth-century thought might have seemed as distinct both from 
each other and from our present concerns as, say, Hindu theology and Mayan numerology” 
(Rorty 1979: 149). So Rorty’s task is to undermine the Kantian image of philosophy, in order 
to persuade philosophers to find something more useful to do. He goes about this on two 
parallel fronts. Firstly, he tells this deconstructive history. And secondly, he argues that the 
mirror of nature idea is fatally flawed, such that even if you neglect to ask yourself about the 
point of tackling its problems, you are still demonstrably wasting your time. In particular, the 
definitive reason it is flawed was brought to light in 1950s analytic philosophy. Thus the 
game was already up by the time Rorty wrote PMN, and it was the need to publicise this 
purported fact – not even realised by the philosophers who made the breakthrough – that led 
him to write it, he tells us (ibid.: 10). 
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Now the aims of dismantling philosophy’s history, undermining its traditional problems, and 
persuading its practitioners to radically change direction, might seem more than enough for 
one monograph to tackle; but Rorty had an even grander ambition for PMN. An ambition that 
does not sit easily with his attempt to downsize philosophy, and occasional comments to the 
effect that philosophy is a “somewhat peripheral academic discipline” (Rorty 1998: 58). But 
nevertheless it was an ambition that clearly drove him on. For Rorty does not think the 
success of the mirror of nature idea can be explained solely in terms of its one-time potential 
for social utility, plus the imaginative brilliance of Kant. Rather, he thinks it spoke to an 
outdated but persistent human need, and that the world would be a better place if we could 
outgrow it. He formulated this need in various ways throughout his writings, but the one I 
like best is the need for “redemptive truth” (Rorty 2007a: 90). Redemptive truth is “a set of 
beliefs which would end, once and for all, the process of reflection on what to do with 
ourselves”; it would present “the one true description of what is going on”, allowing “every 
thing, person, event, idea, and poem” to be fitted into a “context that will somehow reveal 
itself as natural, destined, and unique” (ibid.). It would be, you might say, the meaning of life 
(c.f. ibid.: 84). The grandest ambition of PMN is to persuade us that philosophy will never 
lead us to redemptive truth, that this goal is illusory, and that if we can learn to abandon it, we 
will become better placed to harness the full potential of human life. We would thereby 
complete the process the Enlightenment set in motion. 
 
For all the acute modesty with which Rorty liked to portray himself, his discipline, and his 
first major work, this is the ambition which underpins PMN.4 He thinks the mirror of nature 
idea was seized upon because it offered the prospect of a new, more secular vision of 
redemptive truth, at a time when the power of religion was beginning to wane. For it seemed 
that if philosophy could work out exactly how the mirror (the mind) works, it could 
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determine the conditions under which it accurately reflects the world. On the assumption that 
science meets these conditions, then, the redemptive truth could be discovered, rather than 
divinely revealed, with scientists taking the place of priests as its privileged purveyors; this is 
a task to which science was always very badly suited, in Rorty’s view (ibid.: 98ff.). Or 
alternatively, philosophers could take on the task themselves, by building metaphysical 
systems to reveal the objective truth, and from this basis, work out the redemptive truth about 
what we should do in it.  
 
But both the goal, and the mirror that was supposed to help us reach it, are chimerical, 
according to Rorty. And once we realise this, we will abandon objective truth, stop 
privileging science, and grasp that how we think of ourselves and our world is a matter we 
must decide for ourselves. No fact of the matter will make the decision for us, for we are free 
to describe and redescribe the world to our hearts’ content, thereby discovering fresh 
possibilities and sweeping away descriptions that have outlived their usefulness; this is “the 
most important thing we can do” (Rorty 1979: 358-9). Thus liberated from objective truth, 
our creativity will be unleashed. Human beings will have achieved the prerequisite maturity 
to take control of their own destinies. 
   
To persuade us of all this, Rorty’s strategy is as follows. In the first part of PMN, he tries to 
historically and conceptually deconstruct the mind. Then in the second part, he tries to show 
that the philosophical project of determining when our minds accurately represent the world, 
and thereby produce knowledge, is irrevocably flawed; and that this was demonstrated by 
developments in 1950s analytic philosophy. Now this second task might seem redundant, for 
if Rorty succeeded in persuading us to abandon the mirror of nature in part one, we would 
also have to abandon any hopes for it to show us what constitutes knowledge; no mirror, no 
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reflections. However, a large proportion of part two is taken up with Rorty arguing that we 
should not, after abandoning the mirror, try to reconstruct the project of discovering the 
conditions under which accurate representation takes place. Mind was just the traditional 
philosophical means for seeking redemptive truth, and the one which made philosophers most 
confident they had an ahistorical subject-matter to concern themselves with; but it is the goal 
rather than this particular means which is Rorty’s principal target. Finally, in part three, he 
sketches his utopian vision of life without objective truth, and right at the very end, makes 
suggestions about what philosophy might do in future – in order to avoid accusations of being 
an “end-of-philosophy”-type philosopher (it did not work). CIS subsequently took up these 
suggestions. 
 
And that, in a nutshell, is PMN. I shall now turn to the question of how successful it is; 
successful on its own terms, that is. Already, I think, tensions are discernible from the 
overview I have presented; and I do not think I have skewed it to make this so. For how did 
Rorty expect a work of philosophy to bring about something as culturally enormous as a 
widespread abandonment of objective truth, by showing that philosophy is a much smaller 
and less significant phenomenon than had previously been thought; one which lacks any 
special expertise, and was born out of an idea that has impeded cultural progress? Why 
should anyone listen to a philosopher who says that? And supposing they do, if there is no 
limit to how we describe the world, does not that very assertion admit of redescription? If not, 
surely it must be objectively true, and hence self-contradicting. Relatedly, is not Rorty 
arguing that the mirror of nature idea is objectively false? If so, he cannot conclude that there 
is no objective truth; if not, how do his arguments support his conclusion? In addition, given 
that Rorty’s notion of endless redescription is considerably more conducive to the idealist 
tradition of philosophy than the realist, was he really proposing such a radical break from 
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what he portrayed as the history of philosophy’s pointless oscillation between realism and 
idealism? Was he not simply making the latest case for idealism, while diminishing the 
tradition that provided the only hope of making such grand conclusions viable?  
    
3. Part One 
 
Rorty’s deconstruction of the mind-body problem begins by questioning the unity of the 
concept of mind. Why, he wonders, do we group certain states together as mental, and then 
contrast them with the physical? To presuppose this is a natural grouping and contrast, he 
thinks, is to concede too much to dualism at the outset. After all, pains and beliefs possess no 
obvious commonality – an intuition Rorty shares with many philosophers (e.g. Searle 1983: 
1) – and if even physicalists concede that all these items are at least apparently non-physical 
(for otherwise there would be no problem for them to solve), then this appearance needs to be 
explained. Rorty finds the explanation in a series of historical errors. 
 
Beliefs (and other intentional states) were thought non-physical because of a 
misunderstanding of the nature of meaning. Sensations (and other phenomenal states) were 
thought non-physical because they were conceived as things whose essence is pure 
appearance, in order to provide a primitive account of our privileged access to them; but they 
are actually states of people, and states do not have essences. Then they were yoked together, 
because some intentional states are also phenomenal (e.g. occurrent thoughts), and Descartes 
used this accidental coalescence to reconceive the phenomenal as mental; which he wanted to 
do in order to house the secondary qualities in the mind, and thereby save them from the 
science of Galileo, which seemed to render them illusory. Descartes managed this by spotting 
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an apparent commonality between thoughts and sensations in that they can both be 
indubitable .  
 
And thus the mind-body problem was bequeathed to us. It resulted from mistakes which 
made it seem that sensations and beliefs belong together and cannot be physical. But there is 
no good reason to group them together, so the concept of mind is a mishmash; and neither is 
there any good reason to think they cannot be physical, so there is no obstacle to being a 
physicalist. Note that this entire argument presupposes an agenda shared by most 
contemporary philosophers of mind, namely to defeat dualism and pave the way to 
physicalism. Moreover it all seems to take place on a realist plain, by showing that the real 
nature of meaning and the phenomenal was historically misunderstood, and that the mental is 
not really a unified category. Past philosophers made mistakes because they had obsolete 
theories and were motivated by obsolete social needs. Rorty does not simply argue that it 
would now be more useful to describe the mind as physical; that agenda would have called 
for a completely different approach. Rather, he argues that our predecessors got it wrong, and 
thereby landed us with a pseudo-problem.  
 
This argument, which takes place in Chapter 1, has a couple of loose-ends. For Rorty has yet 
to tell us what privileged access really consists in, and relatedly, why some intentional and 
phenomenal states seem equally indubitable. He takes this up in Chapter 2, but had already 
provided an answer in one of his earlier classics, namely “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the 
Mental” (reprinted in Rorty 2014). In that paper, he adapted Sellars’ idea that the linguistic 
practice of incorrigibility – of granting authority to people’s sincere first-person reports – 
explains intuitions of privileged access. Given that this practice generates no obstacles to 
physicalism, and could in principle die away – if third-person science developed to be more 
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reliable that first-person reporting – then Rorty has everything in place to complete an 
argument for eliminative materialism. And since eliminative materialism is what he was best-
known for at the time, that must have been what his original readers were expecting. 
 
It is not what they got, however, because Rorty was now beginning to transcend analytic 
philosophy in the interests of his endless redescription thesis. Instead, he embarks on a highly 
convoluted discussion of an imaginary alien race – the “Antipodeans” – whose history 
developed in such a way that they never developed a mind-body problem. When we 
Earthlings meet them, they cannot understand what we are talking about, despite the best 
efforts of our philosophers to work out whether they actually have minds or not. The 
imaginary discussion is so convoluted, in fact, that I have always suspected that Rorty 
intended to parody what he regarded as pointless philosophical scholasticism in this chapter. 
In any case, the main conclusion is clear enough, namely that the Antipodeans get along fine 
without the troublesome concept of mind, and there is no good reason we not should follow 
their lead. The surprise comes when Rorty does not reach this conclusion with eliminative 
materialism, which he now rejects on the grounds that there are no facts about reference 
which might determine that terms for mental states have always been referring to physical 
states (Rorty 1979: 118ff.). Incorrigibility is not the mark of the mental, then, just “all that is 
at issue” (ibid.: 121). And his new conclusion is that having seen through the history that 
gave us the problem, and how well the Antipodeans get on without it, we should simply 
refuse to take up a stance within its conceptual tangles; we should just forget about it. Rorty 
still advocates physicalism, understood as the “probably true (but uninteresting)” claim that 
physics can predict “every event in every space-time region” (ibid.: 28); but insists that we 
detach it from the philosophical issue of ontological primacy.5 
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There are some big problems in his argument, which I shall leave for my other essay in this 
volume, ‘Rorty’s Philosophy of Consciousness’. But nevertheless, his general approach, as I 
have argued before (Tartaglia 2008), is one which contemporary debates could learn from. 
The overarching problem I shall press here concerns its motivation and trajectory. For on the 
face of it, the only good reason to try to deconstruct the mind-body problem, and show there 
is no good reason to think the mind cannot be physical, is to defend physicalism; the normal, 
ontological kind, which thinks science gets things right, and that it is important to silence 
challenges to the scientific world-view to hold superstition and anti-science at bay. Now 
Rorty clearly shared some of this motivation, in that the whole of part one is a crusade against 
“mind-stuff”, and he defends his own watered-down version of physicalism. And yet the 
scientific realist perspective of the normal physicalist is his overall target; he does not think 
science, or anything else, gets reality right, and his endless redescription thesis is designed to 
put science in its place by instigating a pluralism according to which all discourses are 
potentially on a par, thereby revealing the privilege traditionally accorded to physics as 
dispensable Enlightenment propaganda. Dualists and idealists broadly share this kind of aim 
– and that places Rorty on both sides of the debate at once.  
 
Light is shed on this situation in a later essay, where he says that “getting rid of spooks (…) 
has exhausted the utility of natural science for either redemptive or political purposes” (Rorty 
2007a: 103). That gets to the heart of it, I think, in that Rorty thought belief in ‘spooks’ was 
socially bad, but that science had already managed to dampen it down, making continued 
philosophical debates about the mind-body problem a waste of time. But Rorty does not 
argue this in PMN; he argues that the mind-body problem is rooted in philosophical errors. 
And in any case, the social question is very much a moot point, especially at this present time 
of writing, when the problem of consciousness is all the rage among both philosophers and 
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scientists, and when scientists are on the verge of creating machines able to perform cognitive 
tasks that only people have previously been capable of. The latter raises social concerns about 
employment redundancies – especially among the traditional middle-class, whose 
dissatisfaction has hitherto been the main engine of social unrest – that future mechanisation 
now seems likely to bring about. Maybe in this situation, we would all be better off 
continuing to believe that consciousness marks a radical division between people and 
machines; if not a principled one, then at least one we currently have no idea how to 
physically enact, despite our growing ability to make machines that behave like us.  
  
Rorty does not consider issues like this, but rather writes as if he has already decided that it is 
socially deleterious to think our minds set us apart from machines. But suppose he had 
considered the social implications and concluded that belief in spooks is good for us. Would 
he then have altered his description of the Antipodeans to present their world as a 
catastrophic dystopia, while defending different theories of meaning and privileged access? If 
he would, then we have no reason to trust his arguments – they could have gone either way, 
depending on the outcome of his secret social deliberations. If he would not, this would 
suggest that he thought reality simply does not contain any spooks; in flagrant violation of his 
overall position. It seems to me that such considerations place Rorty’s entire method of 
argumentation, his final conclusion, and particularly the fit between them, into serious doubt. 
 
4. Part Two 
 
Rorty begins part two by telling his story about Kant’s invention of philosophy. The key 
conceptual blunder which made this possible is attributed to Locke, and is the idea that 
sensations come to us ready-conceptualised, and thus able to provide our epistemic point of 
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contact with the world. So within Lockean empiricism, the idea is that a sensation of redness, 
for instance, comes to us already understood as red, and it is on the basis of such “simple 
ideas” that we build up the rest of the more complex ones we understand the world with. As 
such, all our beliefs can ultimately be traced back to the sensations given to us by our 
perceptual capacities and thereby justified in terms of the world that systematically caused 
them within us. The mirror of nature idea thereby gave theoretical substance to the simple 
empiricism of “experience is the best guide”, offering the prospect of a principled way of 
adjudicating between our various beliefs about the world, to determine which are best 
grounded in the world itself. It was hoped that apparently intractable disputes (such as 
between science and the church) could be decisively settled on a theoretically neutral plain, 
and we could refine our theories to make them maximally sensitive to the world’s impartial 
input, thereby discovering the truth; hopefully a redemptive one. 
 
The trouble with this idea, according to Rorty, is that nothing is ready-conceptualised; neither 
sensations nor anything else. The world does not make sense of things for us; we have to do 
that for ourselves. Kant came close to realising this when he said Locke had “sensualised all 
concepts of the understanding” (Kant 1787: B327), and insisted that concepts and sensory 
input needed to be brought together to generate knowledge. However he wound up simply 
making a more complicated version of the same Lockean mistake, as Rorty sees it, and it was 
not until the 1950s that the problem came clearly into view as what Sellars called the “Myth 
of the Given”. The problem is essentially a mix-up between causal explanation and 
justification; sensations may be part of the causal explanation of knowledge – part of the 
causal condition that generates knowledge – but that does not mean they justify our beliefs, 
and thereby make them count as knowledge. The idea of ready-conceptualised sensations was 
a “mongrel”, as Sellars put it (1956: 21), and there were no other “givens” capable of taking 
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their place. Quine bolstered this argument, as Rorty tells the story, by showing that no 
principled distinction could be made between analytic and synthetic statements, such that the 
truth of the former was determined only by how we define our terms, while the truth of the 
latter depended on the input of the world. Rather all statements are part of the same “web of 
belief”, and the world does not dictate how we adjust this web in light of experience.  
 
Neither Sellars nor Quine realised what they had done, namely shown the theoretical 
bankruptcy of Kant’s discipline. But Rorty did, and concluded that since any attempt to base 
our decisions on something outside of historically contingent conversations will inevitably 
succumb to the Myth of the Given, the justification for our descriptions can have no firmer 
basis than open discussion, and ultimately, considerations of social usefulness. It had seemed 
otherwise, only because the mirror of nature idea persuaded us that knowledge was a relation 
to an object. But it is in fact a relation to a proposition; and a proposition is not the kind of 
thing you can come causally face to face with, to be coerced by its sheer presence. Realising 
this, we become “epistemological behaviourists”, as Rorty rather clumsily put it; “clumsily”, 
because he promotes this in a book arguing for the demise of epistemology. Almost 
immediately after publication, though, he switched to the terminology of “pragmatism” 
(Rorty 1982: chapter 9).  
 
After presenting his pragmatism, Rorty goes on to argue that philosophers should not react by 
looking for a new-and-improved mirror-substitute to ground our conversations in the 
objective truth, such as by looking to developments in empirical psychology, or philosophical 
work on the semantics and logic of language. The same obstacles will face them, and the 
motivation will be just as bad. It is in these chapters (5 and 6) that Rorty’s later dismissal of 
the book as out-dated most rings true. But they were prescient nonetheless, in that 
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philosophers increasingly look to cognitive science for back-up. And these chapters still 
contain plenty of lasting content, much of which has been largely overlooked; such as an 
attempted deconstruction of Kripke’s argument for a causal theory of reference (Rorty 1979: 
288-95), a theory which has persuaded a new generation to take up analytic metaphysics, 
moral realism, a new approach to the mind-body identity theory, and lots of other things 
Rorty would disapprove of. The chapter on philosophy of language also allows Rorty to 
invoke Davidson to complete his deconstructive case. For although Sellars and Quine had 
already shown that the notion of conceptual schemes for understanding the world was unable 
to provide the epistemic guarantees it was designed for, since how we adjust these schemes to 
accommodate the world was not a matter the world would decide, it took Davidson to provide 
the icing on the cake, by undermining the scheme / world distinction altogether – by showing 
that we cannot make sense of the notion of alternative conceptual schemes. This idea, along 
with the distinctively philosophical notions of “world” and “truth” it supported, must be 
abandoned. 
 
How successful was this part of the book? Let us leave aside for now my line of argument 
about the realist plain on which these arguments apparently take place. Namely, was Rorty 
arguing that Kant really invented philosophy, or just trying to persuade us of a useful 
description of the philosophy-phenomenon? Did he think empiricism really is blighted by the 
Myth of the Given, and that there really is no analytic / synthetic or scheme / content 
distinction? Or would he have argued to contrary, if convinced that doing so would be 
socially advantageous? I shall return to this theme shortly. Leaving that aside, then, the first 
thing to note is how thoroughly implausible the Kantian invention of philosophy story is. 
Kant and his immediate predecessors read and were influenced by Plato, Aristotle, and 
Medieval philosophers, and they took up their themes and interests in new ways. And even 
23 
 
leaving aside this direct influence, a common interest in the appearance / reality distinction, 
and its bearing on understanding the human place in the universe, is clearly discernible 
throughout the history of Western philosophy; I simply cannot take seriously the idea that we 
would not still have seen a plain connection between Plato’s and Descartes’ attempts to 
transcend illusory appearance had Kant never been born. Moreover, as we now know, and as 
was beginning to become apparent in the West at around the time of Leibniz, these same 
themes had been independently pursued in other parts of the world since ancient times; a fact 
that Rorty did his best to ignore, and when pressed, tried very ineffectually to deny / 
neutralise (see Tartaglia 2014). It is hard to see what more continuity could possibly be 
required in order to justify philosophy’s traditional self-image. 
 
The only smidgeon of plausibility to Rorty’s thesis is in the idea that Kant brought together 
traditional interests in epistemology, metaphysics, logic and morality, and thereby made it 
possible to conceive them as parts of a distinct discipline bearing the title “philosophy”; 
though it is unclear to me that Plato had not already done that. But in any case, without the 
much weightier thesis Rorty proposes, his idea that philosophical problems stem from 
obsolete social problems loses credibility. For on the face of it, philosophical concerns are as 
natural – in a world where appearance often deviates from reality, and into which we are born 
without an instruction-manual – as concerns with the weather or the relations between 
numbers. Of course, the histories of meteorology and mathematics have been influenced by 
social concerns and needs, but the motivational influence of the need to work out the 
trajectories of cannonballs, for instance, has no bearing on whether the resulting calculations 
were correct. Perhaps Rorty would say that philosophical concerns are obsolete. But 
appearance still deviates from reality, and we are still being born without instruction-manuals 
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– and Rorty’s endless redescription thesis shows concern with the former, while his interest 
in novels as a means of moral education shows concern with the latter. 
 
Nevertheless, perhaps the Myth of the Given puts paid to the mirror of nature approach to 
these concerns by establishing the endless description thesis. Perhaps that was all the 
conclusion Rorty needed; and sticking with it would certainly help him distance himself from 
the end-of-philosophy image he did not like. But I do not think it does establish it. Suppose 
we accept that nothing comes to us ready-conceptualised. Still, something does “come to us”, 
otherwise we would have nothing to talk about. A long tradition in philosophy has concluded 
that to explain the appearance / reality distinction, we must conceptualise this “something” as 
a mental representation. But if the world does not force this conceptualisation on us, and we 
have to decide for ourselves, it does not follow that this conclusion is wrong.  
 
One way to make such decisions is in terms of predictive power, by seeing whether our 
descriptions allow us to make predictions that come true. But in more rarefied cases like 
philosophy, we have to content ourselves with whether our conceptualisations stand up to 
argumentative scrutiny, and produce intellectual satisfaction. Even if there are no conceptual 
schemes, there is still a difference between, say, how a chess player, and somebody who has 
never encountered the game before, will conceptualise a chessboard. And this kind of 
difference provides space for philosophers to debate how best to conceptualise the world, 
even if radically different forms of conceptualisation can be ruled out. Now it is 
extraordinarily hard to suppose that the world has no part to play in these decisions; and even 
Rorty – especially in his passing reference to “contact with reality” as “a causal, non-
intentional, non-description-relative relation” (Rorty 1979: 375) – struggled to consistently 
maintain this stance (see Tartaglia 2007: 212-6 for discussion). But the Myth of the Given 
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idea does not rule this out in any case. It rules out the world playing an atomistic, 
foundational role; but that leaves other ways for it show some of our descriptions to be better 
than others – of the kind Sellars and Quine explored, for instance – and it certainly does not 
show that our only criterion of “better” can be social utility. 
 
5. Part Three 
 
Part three is where Rorty sets down his vision of a society unencumbered by objective truth, 
in which the whole world becomes a text to be endlessly reinterpreted. We are to embrace 
“the power of strangeness” (Rorty 1979: 360) by seeking out new and unfamiliar 
descriptions, so life can never get boring, and we can continually harness fresh forms of 
social utility; this is what our freedom ultimately consists in. Stale descriptions that have 
outlived their usefulness are to be left behind, as life becomes an “infinite striving” (ibid.: 
377) which continually opens up new goals. Freed from the restrictive delusion of a single 
goal dictated by The Truth – a goal which always seemed to hang tantalisingly just ahead of 
us – we will be able to realise our full potential, or rather, decide for ourselves what that 
potential is. We will have outgrown the need for such a goal, which was always just a product 
of insecurity; the felt need for quasi-parental guidance. Systematic philosophy was a product 
of that insecurity, and edifying philosophy is to be welcomed for its continual efforts to 
disrupt its projects; to stop systematic philosophers setting certain descriptions in stone, by 
redescribing their efforts. Edifying philosophy “can never end philosophy”, though it can 
“prevent it from attaining the secure path of a science” (ibid.: 372); but Rorty speculates that 
maybe in the future a “purely edifying” philosophy will arise which is not simply a reaction 
to systematic philosophy, but rather “philosophy” solely in terms of the canon of literature it 
seeks to redescribe (ibid.: 394).  
26 
 
 
Now the stock (and best) response to this vision is presented in Putnam’s objection that Rorty 
is trying to say “from a God’s-Eye View there is no God’s-Eye View” (Putnam 1990: 25). 
This line of objection has been pressed many times (Dworkin 1991 does the best job, I think), 
and the main argument I have been developing so far – and will now complete – is along the 
same lines. However, I shall take into account Rorty’s standard rebuttal (e.g. Rorty 1998: 57), 
namely that he was just making a move in cultural politics: a pragmatic proposal for 
something we should try on the grounds that this promises to bring about greater social 
utility, rather than the philosophical claim that certain arguments establish there is no 
objective truth. And my overriding concern is not to split-hairs with Rorty; for he was more 
than capable of splitting them in response. Such a visionary and broad-brush philosopher 
must be given the maximum benefit of the doubt if you are to effectively engage with him. 
 
So Rorty was not arguing that it is objectively true that there is no objective truth, and hence 
that endless description is possible; and he was not arguing that considerations based on the 
Myth of the Given, for instance, establish this because of their objective truth (because 
causation really is distinct from justification). Rather, he was trying to persuade us to reject 
the concept of objective truth because he thinks believing in endless redescription would be 
useful; the arguments he employs are simply useful for getting us to believe this. But then 
you wonder how useful these arguments could possibly be. For you are only going to think 
the arguments are useful if you think both that endless description is useful, and that 
usefulness is a good enough reason to accept it – and if you think that, then you are not going 
to need the arguments. If you do not think that from the outset, however, then as soon as 
Rorty tells you the arguments are simply a useful means to his conclusion (thereby letting his 
private irony out into the public arena), or else you work it out yourself from the conclusion, 
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you are bound to feel tricked. For you will now realise that the arguments rest entirely on 
your accepting the conclusion they were apparently trying to establish; philosophers who 
naturally enough interpreted the arguments realistically were being seduced to go somewhere 
this interpretation could no longer hold. Either way, the argumentative bulk of PMN becomes 
an irrelevance; for if an argument’s persuasive force depends entirely on its conclusion, it has 
no persuasive force.   
 
Rorty was well aware of the edifying philosopher’s predicament of having to “decry the very 
notion of having a view, while avoid having a view about having views”; he thinks this is 
“awkward, but not impossible” (Rorty 1979: 371). I think that his standard methodology of 
appropriating arguments from philosophers who drew very different conclusions from them 
accentuated the problem. But the main problem comes from the fact that he did have a view: 
he thought it was useful for us to believe in endless description, or at least that we should try 
it out. Without this view, his response to Putnam collapses along with his whole project; and 
in any case, practically his entire philosophical output (post-PMN) makes no sense without it.  
 
The problem is that the notion of “useful” requires some kind of reality, since it begs the 
question “useful for what?” If you answer with something real, then you concede to objective 
truth; but if you answer with yet more usefulness, then the notion is drained of all sense. If 
you think of Rorty’s proposal in a realist way, you can see what he has in mind. The world of 
endless description would be more useful because people will be more creative and 
intellectually flexible, sterile debates will be avoided, etc. Of course, Rorty has not really 
argued that this would be a positive social development, such as by weighing up the social 
costs and benefits – his argumentative strategy is entirely different (it is philosophical) – but 
nevertheless his opinion has a certain plausibility.6 But thinking that people interacting with 
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each other differently will make the world a better place, is thinking of usefulness 
realistically; it is thinking that something about the world makes these interactions useful. Yet 
the endless description thesis tells us not to think of it like this, and instead think the 
description of this situation as more useful is itself simply a useful description. But if it is 
only useful to describe this world as more useful, we are back with the question “useful for 
what?” Rorty might say that it is useful from the perspective of our current description of 
usefulness to describe this world as more useful; because things we now describe as useful 
will become more plentiful. But once we accept that our current description of certain things 
as useful is itself just a useful description, we root usefulness in the description, rather than 
the things; and are left with no idea of what could make a description useful. In the end, we 
will not be able to avoid saying “useful for being useful” – and that means nothing. 
 
Despite his best efforts, useful description became Rorty’s version of the idealist’s substitute 
for physical reality. But unlike the subjective realities of traditional idealism, it was not a 
coherent substitute. Useful description makes sense as something physical, or something 
mental; but not as a self-sustaining reality, since there are useful descriptions only because it 
is useful to describe them that way. The “them” immediately drops out and we no longer 
know what we are talking about. Of course, people could adopt the linguistic practices of the 
endless description world, and receive the benefits Rorty envisages (I am construing these 
benefits the only way I can, namely realistically). But if I am right, then their beliefs would 
be incoherent; so on realising this they would have to either go back to objective truth, or else 
learn to tolerate incoherence – if this kind of tolerance were to spread then I very much doubt 
it would turn out useful by anybody’s lights. But perhaps it would remain a secret known 
only to philosophers, and philosophy would soon be forgotten. This would require philosophy 
to have massive cultural influence one moment (in promoting an incoherent vision), then 
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immediately slip away into obscurity. That is the best outcome I can think of for Rorty’s 
vision; but it requires an awful lot of “ifs”, and so far as I can see, he provides nothing more 
than a few hunches about possible utility to persuade us to take the social experiment.  
 
Now on the face of it, Rorty could have had almost all the benefits he desired by simply 
denying objective truth in morality, politics, and aesthetics, while leaving it in the physical 
world to keep his position coherent, insisting that this base truth cannot be filtered upwards to 
tell us what to do with our lives. After all, he was not promoting the social benefits of endless 
redescription of physical particles, and advocated a form of physicalism himself. Had he just 
made it ontological, his only significant loss would have been the lingering intuition that 
everything else then becomes second-rate truth (which he could have argued against by 
trivialising, but not rejecting, ontology). His Nietzschean worry that we treat objective truth 
as a God-substitute would be curtailed if such truth was limited to natural science, which he 
could have argued can never tell us anything redemptive. Most of the arguments of PMN 
could probably have stayed in place, in fact, had he not reached a conclusion that undermined 
them. So why go the whole hog and embrace endless redescription? Here is my redescription 
of his project; I am not sure if it is useful, but I am not sure why it would need to be.7  
 
Rorty came to philosophical maturity in the radical days of the 1960s; as did Derrida, his 
continental philosophy counterpart. Rorty was an early reader of continental philosophy, 
which was then dominated by the bleak existentialist vision that there is no redemptive truth 
for us humans; life is meaningless, and the best we can do is to strive for authenticity. The 
physicalist analytic philosophy of the day, in which fundamental truth is confined to a dance 
of particles taking place indifferently to our hopes and fears, must have seemed to confirm 
this nihilism; and Rorty knew how much the austerity of the scientific world-view, and the 
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hope for redemptive truth it seems to preclude, concerned the idealist philosophers who he 
chose as the focus of his postgraduate education. Now Rorty liked to tell us that he first came 
to philosophy in search of redemptive truth, but became disillusioned (e.g. Rorty 1999). 
Moreover, according to his first wife’s testimony, as a young man Rorty had strong religious 
proclivities.8 So what could he do to enact the next revolutionary step in philosophy – as the 
times and his inclinations demanded – when redemptive truth seemed untenable, but the 
alternative of a nihilistic truth seemed intolerable? Reject all truth. Then reality and the 
human place within it becomes a matter of interpretation decided by us. We may not get 
redemptive truth, but without the world to get in the way – with the final authority-figure 
silenced, so to speak – we at least recover the freedom to put a positive spin on things. 
 
Rorty gives the game away, I think, in a discussion of Sartre’s existentialism (Rorty 1979: 
361-2). Sartre’s mistake, he says, was to think that it is only the “for-itself” (us) that can be 
endlessly redescribed, as opposed to the “in-itself” (the world), which has a fixed essence. 
Rorty, however, proposes to extend existentialism by rejecting all essentialism, such that 
everything is opened up to endless redescription. Thus at a stroke, the existentialist pathos of 
our distance from an indifferent world is negated, and the meaning of our situation becomes 
as malleable as the literature Rorty spent much of his life immersed in. Existentialism 
evolved into postmodernism. And Rorty held his time in thought. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Though he sometimes acknowledged being involved a long-term struggle (e.g. Rorty 1998: 
41), he certainly knew what he wanted to achieve. 
2 Rorty never actually identifies himself as an ‘edifying’ philosopher in PMN, but he more or 
less equated it with ‘therapeutic’ philosopher (Rorty 1979: 5), and after later abandoning the 
‘edifying / systematic’ distinction (Rorty 2007b: 14), he did call himself a ‘therapeutic’ 
philosopher (Rorty 1998: 142).  
3 Rorty is here amending slightly the position he presented at Rorty 1982: 92 (by making it 
even more minimal). 
4 Contra Neil Gross (2008), I think missionary zeal to realise this ambition presents a 
considerably more plausible candidate for what drove Rorty on, than do mercenary 
considerations for seizing opportunities for career-advancement, and the pressure to develop 
an intellectual self-concept that would allow him to succeed within his institutional settings. 
Gross’s book is easily the strangest biography I have ever read (it is also the only biography 
by a sociologist I have ever read); if Rorty gave it his blessing in order to make a posthumous 
anti-philosophical statement, then he really could not have done better. 
5 Looking back at his earlier papers, I am not sure any of this was terribly new, except for the 
fact that Rorty no longer wanted to be pigeon-holed as an eliminative materialist. 
6 As does the opposite one that it would stifle creativity and generate no end of waffle. 
7 For the full version of the story I am about to tell, within a much wider context, see 
Tartaglia 2016, esp. chapter 2, section 5. 
8 I must admit that this seems very strange to me, given that even truth was to become too 
religious a notion for Rorty; but she says he was ‘dedicated to the greater glory of God 
through philosophy’ (A. O. Rorty 1977: 40). 
